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Financing Bologna, the Internationally Mobile 





Despite the importance of the Bologna process for the mobility of students, and the further 
mobility of graduates, as well as for peace, growth and welfare in that area, nothing has been 
decided so far for the financing of internationally mobile students, so that the burden of that 
financing, usually public, is supported by the host country. Moreover in- and outflows of 
students show imbalances and such imbalances are expected to increase with mobility. 
Therefore, we first suggest and discuss an alternative system transferring the responsibility for 
financing higher education to the country of origin of the students (except for those from 
developing countries). Origin country finances students from its territory through a two-part 
portable voucher: one part is dedicated to the financing of the true cost of studies, the other 
part intends to support student’s life and might be designed in such a way that some social 
goals are reached. Those vouchers can be used anywhere in a defined international area 
provided it is in the designed field of studies and in a school whose quality has been 
recognized by the issuing country. Some actual systems at work in the world, which prefigure 
aspects of the proposal, are presented in appendix. Second, we show that, when coupled with 
a compensation of the origin country in case of international career of the graduate, the 
system proposed in this paper might be equivalent to a centralized efficient design. 
JEL Code: H41, H77, I20. 
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Two features have motivated this research. Both are related to the mobility
of students across European borders. The ﬁrst one is the Bologna process; the
second one is the imbalance between the in- and out-ﬂows of foreign students ob-
served for some countries, especially Austria and Belgium. That imbalance may
preﬁgure the situation in a more integrated higher education area, especially
when the approximation of cultures and the interest for acquiring international
and intercultural skills will be further developed.
Although the ﬁrst feature, the Bologna process, paves the way for a new and
large international market for graduates — especially when combined with the
free mobility of graduates, one of the four freedoms characterizing the European
Union — which can be a serious contribution to peace, welfare and growth in the
geographical area concerned, nothing has been provided regarding the ﬁnancing
of students’ mobility. Therefore, countries with the best schools will be more
attractive for foreign students, but due to the mostly used ﬁnancing mechanism
of higher education, that quality will cost to the residents of the host country.
In economic terms, countries with best higher education will provide the other
countries with a positive externality. Conversely, countries might be tempted
to free ride their better quality neighbors with the risk that such a process
eventually downsizes the global quality of higher education in our part of the
world.
The second feature is basically an empirical observation, not unrelated with
the ﬁrst one. Many students from France and possibly from The Netherlands are
educated in Belgian higher education institutions at the expense of the Belgian
taxpayer. In that sense France free rides Belgium, exporting students whose
education is uncompleted and getting back enriched human capital four or ﬁve
years later; roughly speaking those French students are mostly those who failed
at the admittance competition for paramedical or veterinary medicine studies in
France. That movement is stimulated by the good quality of higher education
in Belgium, as well as by the proximity of language, the unrestricted access - at
least initially - and the low level of tuition fees in Belgium. The same process
appears between Germany and Austria, especially in medicine, and again the
larger country free rides its smaller neighbor. That situation creates imbalances
amounting to 4.7 per cent of the total number of higher education students in
Belgium, and 4.4 per cent, similarly, in Austria — see below.
That situation also involves the appearance of protectionist behaviors from
the local governments, like the introduction of quotas — price discrimination
based on citizenship being prohibited with respect to students from the Euro-
pean Union. Imposing quotas is exactly the reverse of what the Bologna process
aims to stimulate.
Therefore, in order to avoid those negati v ei s s u e s—t h ed e v e l o p m e n to fe x t e r -
nalities and free riding and the possible decrease in quality, and the imbalance
possibly involving protectionist behaviors —, we suggest transferring the respon-
sibility for ﬁnancing higher education from the host country, that where the
foreign human capital is improved and enriched, to the country of origin of the
2students. The country of origin of the students can be viewed as the one where
the students have their permanent residence, or their main attachment, or where
they have obtained their high school degree — see Figure 5 below.
Notice immediately that the students whose country of origin is a developing
country are not concerned by the institutional device proposed and discussed
below. The ﬁnancing of those students needs to obey other rules. Moreover,
mobile students considered in this paper are those who enroll for a term or a
degree in an institution abroad; exchanges t u d e n t s ,l i k eE r a s m u ss t u d e n t s ,a r e
not concerned.
The mechanism suggested in this paper consists for the origin country to
provide his and her students with a two-part portable voucher that they can
use for ﬁnancing their studies, on the one hand, and for covering the cost of
living during the academic year, on the other hand.
The ﬁrst part of the voucher intends to cover the true cost of studies and
m i g h tb er e g a r d e da sat u i t i o nf e ev o u c h e r . I tm a yb eu s e di na n yh i g h e r
education institution of a deﬁned international area — say the Bologna area —
provided it is used in the ﬁeld of studies for which it is dedicated and in a school
whose quality has been recognized by the country of origin, possibly through a
network of certiﬁcation.
The second part of the voucher is dedicated to ﬁnance the cost of living
at home or abroad, and can be called a student support voucher. That part
might be modulated to take into account dissimilarities in costs of living, or
to favor targeted groups of students or ﬁelds of studies, or still to compensate
extra costs related to the family situation of the student. In short one can say
that the second part of the voucher might be equity or fairness-oriented - see
Chevalier and Gérard (2008) for details.
The combination of the two parts of the voucher makes it an interesting tool
to monitor the choice of the studies, and thus of the careers, as well as to favor
a more democratic access to higher education.
Nevertheless, in the analytical developments below we will focus on the ﬁrst
part of the voucher; extension to the second part being straightforward.
Those vouchers can either be provided for free, thus granted, by the respon-
sible government, or they can take the form of a loan, or of a mix of a grant and
a loan. This is up to the origin government to take decision in that matter.
However, as we show in the analytical sections of the paper, as long as stu-
dents going abroad for studies most often come back home after the completion
of those studies and then spend their career time in their country of origin,
providing vouchers for free might be justiﬁed. In a possible future, when the
market for graduates will be EU-wide or Bologna-wide actually, grants might
become an ineﬃcient design: the origin country then generates positive exter-
nalities for the other countries of the area. Therefore the origin country should
be compensated for the higher education provided to its past residents working
abroad. That compensation can take the form of turning the voucher from a
grant to a, possibly contingent, loan, or of an exit, Bhagwati, tax. If the com-
pensation generates a credit against local tax liabilities, it is equivalent that the
compensation is paid by the graduate or by the country where he or she works.
3Moreover, one can show that the combination of vouchers granted by the origin
country and a compensation in case of international career, makes the outcome
of that system equivalent to that of a centralized eﬃcient design.
The practicability of the system depicted above will depend on the integra-
tion of the Bologna or otherwise deﬁned area. In the sequel of the paper we
speak about the Bologna area. By that term we mean the area covered by a
network of bi- or multi-lateral agreements organizing the system suggested and
discussed in that paper. The concerned countries already have a long experience
of a network of treaties in tax and social security matters so that the institu-
tional design presented here is not infeasible. Roughly speaking, part of what
is proposed and discussed in this paper for higher education, already applies in
the EU for medical care abroad; and the compensation of the origin country
echoes what already applies for soccer players: the club of origin may receive
compensation for the initial training of the player during his or her whole career.
Thereafter in this section we come back on the two features motivating the
paper as well as on the relevant literature. Then in section 2 we present the
proposition of a two-part voucher and characterize its properties. Section 3
introduces the model we use for the formal analysis of the core of the proposal.
Sections 4 to 7 are then dedicated to the examination of four institutional designs
using the model of section 3; those designs respectively are centralization, the
current system applying the Production Principle - higher education is ﬁnanced
by the country where schools are located -, the proposed system of vouchers and
application of the Origin Principle - higher education students are ﬁnanced by
vouchers provided by their country of origin - and a mechanism where vouchers
are completed by a compensation of the origin country in case of international
career through grants turned into loans or through a Bhagwati tax. A summary
and conclusions are proposed in section 8. The reader will ﬁnd in appendix how
some actual country practices preﬁgure the system discussed in the paper.
Let us stress that this paper deliberately remains in the European tradition of
a system of higher education basically ﬁnanced through public funds - Aghion et
al. (2008). This option is chosen since it is the most realistic in today Europe.
Even the scholars who advocate higher education ﬁnanced basically through
contingent loans recognize that those loans should be provided by the public
authorities - see the Australian case in appendix - or that those authorities
should provide the ﬁnancial system with public collaterals due to the ineﬃciency
of that credit market. Therefore, like Justmann and Thisse (1997, 2000), we
consider that higher education is provided by the public sector for exogenous
reasons; see also Andersson and Konrad (2003), Barr (1998) and Poutvara and
Kanniainen (2000).
1.1 The Bologna Process
The Bologna process is now well known, at least among Europeans. It was
launched in the Italian eponym city on June 19, 1999, when the representatives
of the Ministers of Higher Education of 31 European countries or sub-national
4jurisdictions signed a common declaration, which intended to achieve some ob-
jectives within the ﬁrst decade of the new millennium.
The philosophy of the Bologna Process is well summarized in the Bologna
Declaration. The declaration states that ‘A Europe of Knowledge is now widely
recognized as an irreplaceable factor for social and human growth and as an
indispensable component to consolidate and enrich the European citizenship,
capable of giving its citizens the necessary competencies to face the challenges of
the new millennium, together with an awareness of shared values and belonging
to a common social and cultural space.’
Then signatories recognize the ‘Importance of education and educational co-
operation in the development and strengthening of stable, peaceful and demo-
cratic societies’ and ‘Universities’ central role in developing European cultural
dimensions’. They promote the ‘creation of the European area of higher ed-
ucation as a key way to promote citizens’ mobility and employability and the
Continent’s overall development.’
In line with this philosophy six main goals were to be implemented
• Adoption of a system of easily readable and comparable degrees in
order to promote European citizens employability and the international com-
petitiveness of the European higher education system.
• Adoption of a system essentially based on two main cycles.
• Establishment of a system of credits as a proper means of promoting
the most widespread student mobility.
• Promotion of mobility by overcoming obstacles to the eﬀective exercise
of free movement.
• Promotion of European cooperation in quality assurance.
• Promotion of the necessary European dimensions in higher education.
Therefore, any restriction to the mobility of students, like quotas, opposes
the Bologna Process. The question is then the following: how to reconcile the
promotion of students’ free mobility with a fair and eﬃcient distribution of the
costs, given the European law and general principles, including the tradition of
a higher education system extensively ﬁnanced through the public authorities.
1.2 Empirical observation: cross-border imbalances in a
world of growing student mobility
At global level, international student mobility seems to have been increasing for
a long time, as depicted in Figure 1. However it is unevenly distributed, the ﬂow
of foreign students concentrating on some countries, as illustrated by Figures
2, 3 and 4. This produces the imbalances put forward in Table 1. Moreover
the concept of foreign student needs to be reﬁned: is he or she a non-citizen, a
non-national, someone who obtained his or her previous — high school, bachelor
— degree in another country? That issue is illustrated by Figure 5.
Therefore, the quality of global data is questionable. Fortunately, that qual-
ity increases when we focus on data at OECD or EU level, and some projects,
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Figure 1 - Evolution of the number of foreign students tertiary education
between 1975 and 2005 (OECD (2007), Education at a Glance 2007,
indicator C.3, p. 303)
Interestingly, international students’ mobility is very concentrated on some
countries, as shown in Figures 2 and 3, which also reveal that some countries
have lost market shares while some other countries have gained shares between
2000 and 2005.
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Figure 2 - International higher education market share by
country of destination in 2000 (OECD (2007), Education at























Figure 3 - International higher education market share by
country of destination in 2005 (OECD (2007), Education
at a glance 2007, indicator C.3, p. 304
Figure 4 shows the OECD countries with the largest share of foreign students
and Table 1 sets forth the imbalance.
 
























Figure 4 - Share of tertiary education international students per
host country in 2005 (OECD (2007), Education at a glance 2007,
indicator C.3, p. 298.
7Country EU foreign students as 
% of total 
Nationals studying 
abroad minus EU 
foreign students as % 
of total 
Belgium 6,46%  -4,69% 
Austria 8,07%  -4,42% 
United Kingdom  4,04%  -3,56% 
Sweden 3,57%  -2,65% 
Germany 3,01%  -1,82% 
Ireland 2,34%  -1,52% 
Czech Republic  2,66%  -1,09% 
Netherlands 2,03%  -0,75% 
Denmark 1,59%  -0,47% 
France 1,63%  -0,39% 
Spain 0,51%  0,29% 
Hungary 0,91%  0,49% 
Italy 0,62%  0,65% 
Poland 0,04%  1,13% 
Portugal 0,65%  1,34% 
Finland 0,63%  1,47% 
Greece 0,04%  3,15% 
Slovak Republic  0,36%  8,35% 
Luxembourg 0,00%  187,77% 
 
Table 1 - EU originated foreign students in higher education and net
(im-) balance as a percentage of the total higher education population
(source: Gérard and Vandenberghe, 2007a)
Inspection of Table 1 shows that Belgium and Austria support the cost of
other countries higher education. Luxembourg is an example of a country that,
to a large extend, externalizes the cost of its citizens’ higher education.
  CATEGORIES OF STUDENTS AS REPORTED BY THE HOST 
Prior education outside the  Non-
citizens 
Citizens 
1  2 
5 
3  4 
6 




Figure 5 - Various criteria used to deﬁne mobile students.
8In the next section we propose a system which can overcome the eﬀects of
that imbalance.
1.3 Related literature
This paper takes place in a series of contribution by Gérard and coauthors
(Gérard 2006a,b, 2007, 2008, Gérard and Vandenberghe, 2007a,b, Chevalier
and Gérard, 2008); related literature ﬁrst includes Mechtenberg and Strausz
(2006, 2008), which inspired part of our analysis. As they say, ‘the relation
between mobility and human capital has for long been on the agenda of economic
research’.
According to those authors, relevant literature indeed ﬁrst refers to the
contributions on the brain drain (see Grubel and Scott, 1966; Bhagwati and
Hamada, 1974). In a similar context, Justman and Thisse (1997, 2000) point
out the link between mobility and underprovision of publicly provided educa-
tion. By contrast, Stark et al. (1997), Beine et al. (2001), and Stark and Wang
(2002) also consider private investment in education. More recently, both forms
of ﬁnancing education are taken into account by Poutvara (2004a,b). Quoting
Mechtenberg and Strausz again ‘the most stable result established by this kind
of literature is that although increasing mobility [...] will lead to higher pri-
vate investment in education, public provision will decrease. The government
will tend to free ride on the education system of other country’. Buettner and
Schwager (2004) produces similar results while, next to the free-rider eﬀect,
Kemnitz (2005) also considers the competition eﬀect for governments providing
education to mobile students. The present paper has some features in common
with Mechtenberg and Strausz; however, it departs from that contribution by
focusing on the issue of which country should be responsible for ﬁnancing foreign
students, regarded from the point of view of eﬃciency and ﬁscal federalism.
Interested reader will also read Bache (2006), Sapir et al. (2003), Aghion
et al. (2008) and van der Ploeg and Veugelers (2008). Indeed, although the
Bologna process concerns a geographic area larger than the territory of the
European Union, one can say that, together with the Sapir Report and the
Lisbon Agenda, it generates a large debate around higher education in Europe.
Finally on vouchers, also called entitlements by some scholars, see also the
frequently quoted contribution of Levin (1983); and especially on the application
of that mechanism to higher education, see e.g. the discussion proposed by
Jongbloed and Koelman (2000).
2 Proposition: A two-part portable voucher plus
international compensation
In most countries of the Bologna area — an area which encompasses the European
Union — higher education is publicly funded and students only pay a small tuition
fee.
9Moreover EU legislation prohibits charging foreign EU students a fee diﬀer-
ent from the one asked from nationals. That latter restriction makes the EU
ﬁnancing of higher education, much diﬀerent from that prevailing e.g. in the
US, where non-residents of the ﬁnancing state are charged a higher fee, at least
for their ﬁrst year of residence.
It turns out that the cost of EU foreign students is supported by the host
country. That cost will go up with the expected increasing mobility of stu-
dents: countries made attractive by the high quality of their higher education
will have to ﬁnance an increasing inﬂow of foreign students and thus to subsidize
the enrichment of human capital of other countries. Such a situation, through
the externalities generated, can involve ineﬃciencies, the adoption of restric-
tive behaviors by governments and an underprovision of publicly funded higher
education — see the survey of the literature above. Indeed, countries which
experiment imbalances — those who welcome a relatively larger number of stu-
dents from abroad than the number of their nationals that they send abroad,
like Austria and Belgium — tend to turn the prohibition of price discrimination
through the adoption of quantitative quotas.
In line with the Bologna philosophy we propose to move from a system
where the local public authorities are responsible for the ﬁnancing of the studies
supplied on their territory to a system where those authorities are responsible
for the ﬁnancing of the studies demanded by the students from their territory.
To ﬁx the ideas — see Figure 5 above — we may consider as students from a
territory those who have obtained their previous degree (high shool, bachelor)
on that territory after spending some years of studies in that territory.
Financing the students can take the form of issuing two-part portable vouch-
ers.
We complete that mechanism with the suggestion of a system of compensa-
tion for the country which issued the vouchers, in case of further international
career of the graduate.
2.1 A ﬁr s tp a r tt oc o v e rt h er e a lc o s to fs t u d i e s
The ﬁrst part of the voucher is designed to ﬁnance the real cost of studies at
home or abroad.
The student who wants to enroll, say for the ﬁrst year of a master program in
math’s, applies for a voucher for that year and ﬁeld of studies. The competent
authority issues the voucher possibly subject to some conditions — see below —
and the student gives the voucher to the higher education institution where he
or she has been accepted; that institution presents the voucher to the issuing
authority and receives the corresponding amount of money. Possibly an inter-
national clearing system is set up like the inter-cantonal clearing in Switzerland
— see below appendix section 10.1.
Table 2, based on actual subsidies in the French-speaking Community of
Belgium, provides an illustration of what could be that ﬁrst part of the voucher.
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Bachelor or Master degree in philosophy; theology; languages and literature; history, arts 
and archaeology; architecture and urbanism; information and communication; political 
sciences and sociology; law; criminology; economics and management; education and 
psychology 
5.597 
First or second year of Bachelor degree in medical sciences; veterinary medicine; 
dentistry; agricultural engineering; engineering; Bachelor or Master degree in arts or arts 
sciences 
11.195 
Third year of Bachelor or Master degree in medical sciences; veterinary medicine; 
dentistry; natural sciences; agricultural engineering; engineering. 
16.792 
 
Non-University Higher Education 
 
 
Economics (3 year-professional bachelor degree)  4.665 
Economics (other degrees), technology (3 year-professional bachelor degree)  5.132 
Agriculture (3 year-professional bachelor degree), social sciences  5.365 
Engineering  5.598 
Interpreters and translators  6.765 
Health sciences  6.998 
 
Table 2 - Estimates of the ﬁrst part voucher value in EUROS. Source: Gérard
and Vandenberghe (2007b). Estimates by ﬁeld of studies, based on the
2005-2006 budget of the French-speaking Community of Belgium for the
variable part of the ﬁnancing.
2.2 Subject to some conditions, especially of recognized
quality
It is up to the issuing authority to decide on the number of vouchers supplied
for a given ﬁeld and year.
The French government may, for instance, organize a competition for a pre-
determined number of vouchers in veterinary medicine. Applicants who fail
to get the voucher can still be accepted by schools but then at a (high) price
covering the real cost of the studies, either at home or abroad. Alternatively
the schools may decide not to accept those unfunded students or, possibly, pro-
visions in the international agreement organizing the system, may compel the
schools to reject those applicants. In that latter case, partner countries help
France enforcing its numerus clausus — the issue of a limited number of vouch-
ers. Then indeed French students — the most likely to practice in France after
completing their studies — no longer have the opportunity to overcome that
quantitative limit deemed to be justiﬁed by the needs for a given profession.1
The use of the vouchers should also be limited to schools whose quality has
been guaranteed or certiﬁed. That might be organized through a process of mu-
1In this paper, we do not question the reason why a given country decides to limit the
access to a given ﬁe l do fs t u d i e s ;t h a td e c i s i o ni sh o l da sa ne x o g e n o u sc o m p o n e n to ft h e
setting.
11tual recognition — a school agreed by local domestic authorities is automatically
agreed by partner countries — or through a process of certiﬁcation by private or
public agencies, like the Equis certiﬁcation for business schools.
2.3 A second part to support student’s life
The other part of the voucher is designed for supporting the cost of living. It
may consist of a ﬁxed amount of money or can be modulated depending on a
series of parameters.
Let us mention some of them: the place the students will have to live, the
belonging of the student to a targeted group — ethnic minority, immigrant, poor
family, in intellectual or money terms —, the type of studies he or she intends
to follow — that part of the voucher can be used to provide the students with
incentives to undertake studies for which there is a social need not recognized
by a high salary, like teacher or professor in secondary schools, the composition
of the student’s family like he or she having dependents.
The modularity of that part of the voucher is illustrated by the example of
Norway in appendix section 10.2. below. In any case it makes it an interest-
ing tool for introducing equity or fairness elements in the way student’s life is
ﬁnanced. However we know that equity goals in education should gain to be
met earlier in the education process — Woessmann (2006), Vandenberghe (2007),
Heckman and Carneiro (2003).
2.4 Grant, loan or a mix
The voucher can take the form of a grant from the authorities of the country
of origin, or of a (contingent) loan2 from those authorities or from a bank with
possibly those authorities providing public collaterals3, or of a mix of a grant
and a loan — see the case of Australia in appendix section 10.3. It is up to the
domestic authorities to decide.
Nevertheless one can show that as long as most students going abroad come
back home after completing their studies and then spend their career in their
country of origin — in today Europe, except for sweet heart reasons most students
go back home after their studies, the many reasons for that can be summarized
through the concept of attachment to home, see Mansoorian and Myers (1993)
— grants might be a sustainable solution — see Gérard (2007 and below).
2A loan is said ‘contingent’ when its charge depends on characteristics of the graduate, like
his or her income; in that latter case the loan is said ‘income contingent’. Since in this paper,
the loan may be income contingent but does not need to be, we put ‘contingent’ between
parentheses.
3Those loans, especially when income contingent, present a high degree of risk; there-
fore, especially in the European context, the fair operation of the system calls for collaterals
provided by the public sector.
122.5 Completed with a compensation for the country of
origin in case of international career of the graduate
If mobility of graduates goes up, the device above can no longer be sustainable
and ineﬃciencies may appear through externalities: a country x ﬁnances higher
education of a person originally resident of that country, either in country x or
in country y, but that education will eventually proﬁtt oc o u n t r yz,w h e r et h e
graduate will work and pay taxes. In that latter case, a compensation of the
origin country, that which has issued the vouchers and thus ﬁnanced the human
capital of the graduate, might be considered. It may consist in turning vouchers
from grants to loans, possibly income contingent - Ederveen and Thissen (2008)
also shows that increased mobility calls for an individualization of higher edu-
cation ﬁnancing - or in imposing a tax on graduates working abroad; that tax
looks as a Bhagwati tax - see Bhagwati (1976), Wilson (2008).
We show later in the paper that the combination of a system of vouchers and
a compensation for the issuing country in case of further international career
of the graduate is a substitute for a centralized eﬃcient design. Notice that,
provided that the charge of the loan or of the Bhagwati tax provides the debtor
with a credit against his or her local tax liabilities, it is equivalent to have those
charges paid by that individual or by the local authorities.
Of course an alternative solution is to have the vouchers granted by a central
agency operated at EU or Bologna area level. That device however does not
seem to be compatible with the subsidiarity principle: clearly a decentralized
solution exists which can allow each member state to decide on the high of the
vouchers.
3 The model
Thereafter we successively depict the demand and supply of credits and the
equilibrium of the market for credits, assuming that a degree is granted after
successful completion of a given number of credits. For example, in the Bologna
area, a bachelor degree may need 180 credits, and a master degree, a further 120
credits. The equilibrium might result from the use of a market clearing tuition
fee or be the minimum of supply and demand if no such pricing mechanism is
at work. More generally we consider a world with two (local) jurisdictions i and
j called the jurisdictions or the countries, and a federal or central jurisdiction
named the centre. The executives of the jurisdictions are governments; the
executive of the centre is a central agency like the European commission.
3.1 The demand for credits
The representative student of a given jurisdiction i decides on the number of
credits (in the Bologna area they are called ECTS for Exchange Credits Transfer
System) that he or she wants to get at home and abroad, nii and nij respectively.
The money return on credits obtained at home is mf(nii) if the student
13decides to work at home after completing his or her studies and b mf(nii) if he or
she migrates to the other jurisdiction after studies. The probability to work at
h o m e ,f o rt h ee n t i r ec a r e e r ,i sρh; that probability is totally exogenous. Thus,
in average, credits obtained at home pay m0f(nii)=[ ρhm +( 1− ρh) b m]f(nii)
per credit. The corresponding return on credits obtained abroad are mf (nij)
if the degree is then used in the country of origin, an event of probability ρf,
and b mf (nij) if the degree is valued in the country of studies, i.e. the student
remains abroad after completing his or her degree; in average the return per
credit abroad is e mf (nij)=[ ρfm +( 1− ρf) b m]f (nij).
We assume that m ≥ b m ≥m: studies abroad are especially valued in the ori-
gin country through a high money reward for foreign credits; ex-foreign students
are also appreciated because they bring a touch of openness in the country. We
assume f0 > 0 and f” < 0.
However getting credits has a cost: a sacriﬁce in terms of unskilled wage wi,
possibly a tuition fee pii or pij to be paid at home or abroad and, in cases of
studies abroad, an extra cost in terms of, say, acquisition of a foreign language,
accommodation and transportation to be paid from the home jurisdiction q (nij),
q0 > 0, q00 > 0. We name that latter cost mobility cost.
Moreover, in line with the proposition issued above, the student may receive
a voucher per credit - then we assume p =0 . The voucher will be used to cover
the actual cost of studies so that it does not enter the set of parameters of the
utility function of the student - the student simply channels the voucher. If the
voucher also covers the extra costs q (nij), that parameter disappears from the
utility function when covered by the voucher; we indicate that possibility by
setting a δq before the extra costs parameter - δq =0if the voucher covers extra
costs, otherwise δq =1 .
Vouchers are either provided for free or sold at a price pv
ii or pv
ij where the
subscript ﬁrst indicates the issuing country - in our case country i - and second
whether the voucher is for use in the domestic i country or in the foreign country
j.
Although the mobile graduate may possibly be required to compensate its
country of origin, that device doesn’t aﬀect his or her choice since we assume
that the compensation might be credited against the local tax liabilities - this
is supposed to be a provision of the treaty enforcing the system.
Given those parameters, the individual maximizes his or her utility function
supposed to be additive separable4




From the ﬁrst order conditions of that maximization,
m0f0(nii)=wi + pii + pv
ii
e mf0 (nij)=wi + pij + δqq0 (nij)+pv
ij (2)
4A more general speciﬁcation could substitute F(nii,n ij) for m0f(nii)+h mf (nij).














which form the demand functions, or demand system, for credits.
Second order condition holds since f” − δqq” < 0.
Let us highlight the reasoning above and specify f (n) as lnn and q (n) as









wi + pij + δqq + pv
ij
(4)
In the sequel of the paper we will make an extensive use of that speciﬁcation
of the demand functions as well as of the hypothesis that the countries are
symmetric; in line with that latter hypothesis we will drop subscripts i and j
and use h and f instead of ii (viz. jj)a n dij (viz. ji) respectively.
3.2 The supply of credits
We assume that universities are public in the sense that they make own the
objective of the government of their country. Therefore we assume that the
supply of credits is decided by the government, which maximizes a Social Welfare
Function deﬁned on the future contribution to GDP of graduates educated at
home or abroad, who will be resident of the jurisdiction, net of the sacriﬁce in
terms of immediate contribution to GDP involved by the studies of the residents,
of the cost of the public funds levied to ﬁnance the production of credits and of
the costs related to studies abroad, but grossed with the tuition fee and the net
inﬂow of possible compensations.
Thus social welfare functions are such that
Wi = θρf(nii)+θρf (nij) − wi (nii + nij) − pijnij − q (nij)












and similarly for Wj.
In that equation τ represents the compensation transferred from a country to
another, either because the graduate working abroad has seen his or her voucher
turned into a loan, or because a Bhagwati tax is due, both being deductible
against local tax liabilities; the ﬁrst subscript refers to the origin country of the
student, the second one to the country where he studied, while the superscript
indicates the paying jurisdiction - the foreign jurisdiction where the graduate
works; δ =1if that compensation system is at work, δ =0otherwise.
15We allow for θ diﬀerent from m, by which is meant that the social return on
higher education might be diﬀerent from the private one.5 Finally c(nii + nji)
is the cost for the public sector of providing higher education, including the
eﬃciency cost of turning, say, a lump sum tax into a subsidy to universities -
see Laﬀont-Tirole (1993); we assume c0,c” > 0. Without loss of generality we
can linearize that latter function and set c(nii + nji)=cnii + cnji;w ea s s u m e
c identical across countries. The other parameters have been deﬁned above.
First order conditions of the maximization of Wi are,
θρf0(nii)=wi + c − δτ
j
ii
θρf0 (nij)=wi + pij + q + vij − δτ
j
ij
b θ(1 − ρ)f0 (nji)=c − pji + δτi
ji (6)
However all those conditions are not required to hold simultaneously. As we
will seen later on, the ﬁrst and last conditions have to hold under the current
system based on the Production Principle, but then there are no voucher nor
compensation (δ =0 ); the ﬁrst and second conditions have to hold under the al-
ternative Origin Principle where vouchers are considered, and of course when we
extend the model assuming an increased mobility of graduates and introducing
compensations across countries.
Second order condition is satisﬁed since f00 < 0.















b θ(1 − ρ)
c − pji − δτi
ji
(7)
We can now consider four relevant cases separately. The ﬁrst one assumes
that the ﬁnancing of higher education is centralized: a centre has been set up
at the level of the Bologna area and is in charge of ﬁnancing higher education;
this is the benchmark eﬃcient case. The second one corresponds to the current
application of the Production Principle. The third one refers to the application
of the alternative Origin Principle and introduces the voucher (p =0 , v = c+δqq,
δ =0 ). Finally, the fourth case combines voucher and some refund in case of
career abroad (δ =1 ), either under the form of a grant turned into a (contingent)
loan or of a Bhagwati tax; that case is especially relevant when the mobility of
graduates becomes important.
5It is often considered that the social return on higher education exceeds the private one,
however authors like Jacobs and van der Ploeg (2006) argue that θ does not exceed m.T h e r e -
fore we only assume that θ may diﬀer from m.
164A c e n t r a l i z e d d e v i c e
Let us start with the centralized device: a centre has been set up at the level of
the Bologna area and is in charge of ﬁnancing higher education. That setting
is an interesting benchmark where spillover eﬀects have been internalized, and
which therefore makes sense for an integrated area where the degree of mobility
of students and graduates is high; however that setting is in opposition with the
subsidiarity principle at the root of the functioning of the European Union.
Since, in this centralized device, there is actually a single jurisdiction with a
single ﬁnancing authority, the explicit use of vouchers and compensation do not
justify - in other words vouchers should be just a way to channel funds from the
central agency to the schools - except for the part of vouchers which possibly
covers the extra costs related to studying abroad, δq =0 . Then, demand for








w + pf + δqq
(8)
Since the centre jointly maximizes Wi and Wj, the supply of credits is, from








w + q + c
(9)
4.1 Price equilibrium
The equilibrium between supply and demand for credits can be reached through
a system of tuition fees. Using the latter two sets of equations, we obtain, ﬁrst















Especially, if private and social returns coincide,
pC
f = pC
h = c (11)
6Maximizing Wi + Wj with respect to nii and nij implies
θρf0 (nii)+e θ(1 − ρ)f0 (nii)=θ0f0 (nii)=wi + c
θρf0 (nij)+e θ (1 − ρ)f0 (nij)=h θf0 (nij)=wi + q + c
17and both domestic and foreign students are charged a tuition fee equal to the
marginal cost of studies. Otherwise the tuition fee will be smaller if the social
return exceeds the private one, and conversely, the tuition fee will be larger if
the private return exceeds the social one. Not irrelevant at all is the case where
a degree obtained abroad is overvalued by the labor market, so that e m>e θ
although m0 = θ0; then the model justiﬁes charging a higher tuition fee to
foreign students: the local university sells them the rent represented by their
diploma.




f + q (12)
so that the socialization of extra costs has been oﬀset.
4.2 Non-price equilibrium
We know that public prices may obey other goals than eﬃciency, like equity,














and eﬀective amounts of credits will correspond to the minimum of demand and
supply, thus here to supply - see equation (9). Since the supply of credits is not
a function of the tuition fee in this model, the eﬀective number of credits is the
same under both the price and the non-price equilibria.
Therefore, in the sequel of the paper, we term the equilibrium prices deﬁned
by equation (10) the eﬃcient prices or the eﬃcient tuition fees, and the amounts
of credits deﬁn e db ye q u a t i o n( 9 )t h ee ﬃcient numbers of credits.
5 The current system: applying the Production
Principle
Most countries of the Bologna area, and thus most member states of the Eu-
ropean Union, apply the Production Principle, by which is meant that the lo-
cal government ﬁnances the schools of higher education located in its territory
where they produce an enriched human capital. Therefore higher education of
the foreign students is ﬁnanced by the taxpayers of the host country.
We assume that the governments directly compensate the schools for the
cost of the studies except for a small tuition fee that students might be required
to pay by their own; there is no voucher nor contingent loan or interjurisdic-
tional compensation in that case although, as in the centralized device, such
18mechanisms could be introduced without altering the results. Nevertheless we
still compute the prices equating supply and demand, even if they are no longer
eﬃcient.








wi + pij + q
(14)
while the local government decides on the supply of credits to local and foreign
students, nii and nji







b θ(1 − ρf)
c − pji
(15)
Comparison of equations (9) and (15), on the one hand, and of equations
(8) and (14), on the other hand, immediately reveals that the supply function
for domestic credits has shifted leftward while the demand line remained un-
changed. Consequently equilibrium price has departed from its value according
to equation (10), becoming ineﬃciently high8 and involving too few credits ob-
tained at home by domestic students; especially, if social and private returns
on higher education are equal, the equilibrium price for domestic credits now
exceeds the marginal cost of studies. The intuition behind that reasoning is that
local government only takes into account the students who remain at home after
their studies. Termed otherwise, the government corrects its supply of credits
for the expected outﬂow of graduates.
Conversely the equilibrium price for credits abroad becomes smaller than
the eﬃcient price computed in the previous section.9 This is because the local
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h m + e θ
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1 − ρf
 (w + q) <















< 0; especially, if θ − m =0 , that condition turns out to
be ρf < 1.
Notice that, for students expected not to return home, the tuition fee derived above becomes
pf =
e m
e θ + e m
c −
e θ
e θ + e m
(w + q)
or, if e θ = e m,
pf =
c − w − q
2
19government only balances the future contribution to local GDP of the foreign
students expected to remain in its country after completing their studies, with
their net cost for that sole country, c−pji, thus disregarding the costs in terms
of lost contribution to the GDP, w, and extra costs q, supported by the other
country. In that case the equilibrium price is ineﬃciently low and even below
the marginal cost of studies and below the equilibrium tuition charged to local
students.
Anyway, if the tuition fee charged to both groups of students is a comprised
between zero and the eﬃcient value pC,d e ﬁn e di nt h ec e n t r a l i z e dc a s e ,t h u sa s





, k = f,h, there are too few students getting credits
at home and too few students as well getting credits abroad, provided that, for
the latter group, supposing c − a>0,
ρf >
b θ(w + q + a)
b θ(w + q + a)+θ(c − a)
(16)
6 An alternative system (I): applying the Origin
Principle using vouchers
Suppose now that the local government no longer ﬁnances schools of higher
education located in its territory but students from its territory who want to
study either at home or abroad. This is what we call applying the Origin
Principle.
Then, unlike in the previous case, the government of country i now decides on
nii and nij,10 To those students the government gives a voucher corresponding
to the true cost c of studies plus possibly an amount covering extra costs q
related to studies abroad - vii = c, vij = c +( 1− δq)q. The vouchers are
provided for free - we relax that assumption at the end of the section. Demand










while the supply of credits is provided by the ﬁrst two lines of equation (7) -








wi + q + c
(18)
which can be regarded as a strategic brain drain price to attract bright foreign students.
On the contrary, if foreign students are expected to leave the country after their degree,
then the equilibrium tuition fee is pP
f = c.
10The sum of those ﬁgures can be understood as a numerus clausus enforced across borders.
20From the comparison of those two equations it turns out that the eﬀective
amounts of credits are given by the latter.
Now, that outcome should be compared with its counterparts under the
benchmark centralized case and the application of the Production Principle



















From the inspection of that table we conclude that, in the absence of tuition
fee supported by the students, (1) the amount of credits obtained at home is
the same under the Origin Principle as under the Production Principle, and is
ineﬃciently low except if ρ =1 ; (2) the amount of credits obtained abroad is
larger under the Origin Principle than under the Production Principle, provided
that
ρf >
b θ(w + q + c)
b θ(w + q + c)+θc
≡ ρ
f (19)
and, moreover, that amount remains ineﬃciently low except of ρ =1 .
We can then issue the following proposition:
Proposition 1 In the absence of tuition fee charged to the students, a system
of ﬁnancing higher education students based on the Origin Principle is more eﬃ-
cient than a system of ﬁnancing schools of higher education based on the Produc-
tion Principle, provided that the probability of returning home after completing
the studies and then spending career at home, is larger than some threshold.
Two remarks usefully complete the development above and the proposition.
First, one can easily show that, at least in a symmetric world, the two countries
gain from adopting the reform. Indeed the condition for both countries to gain














where superscripts O and P refer to the Origin and Production principles re-


















f > 0. Then the condition reduces to
˜ θ















where superscript C refers to the centralized device. That condition is satisﬁed
since nC
f is larger than both nO
f and nP
f .
Otherwise, in that system, the vouchers could be not provided for free but
charged prices pv
h and pv
f respectively. An extreme solution could be to have
those latter prices equalizing supply and demand for credits at home and abroad.


















wi + c + q
= ns
ij (24)
However those prices are ineﬃcient for the same reason as the equilibrium tuition
fees under the Production Principle - external eﬀects are not taken into account
in the supply functions.
7 An alternative system (II): when mobility of
graduates increases, both the origin and des-
tination countries need to contribute
The system examined in the previous section is more eﬃcient than the current
one as long as mobility after completion of studies remains below some threshold.
In other terms, if ρf become smaller than ρ
f provided by equation (19), the
system of vouchers provided by the country of origin is no longer more eﬃcient
than the current one based on the Production Principle.
Let us now investigate how that system can be completed to be relevant for
a world where the mobility of graduates increases. The ultimate goal of the
Bologna process can be viewed indeed as the creation of a European-wide labor
market. Therefore, let us reinterpret 1 − ρk,k= h,f as the probability for
a graduate that the other country becomes his or her country of destination:
he or she will spend his or her career in that country. Equivalently 1 − ρk
represents the fraction of the career time spent outside the country of origin of
the graduate.
Now let us introduce the following institutional device: if a graduate does
not spend his or her career time in his or her country of origin, he or she has
to compensate that country for the ﬁnancing of his or her studies, possibly pro
rata temporis. In practice, that means that either the voucher, initially granted,
is turned into a loan, possibly a contingent loan, and that the graduate has to
pay some amount for each year spent outside his or her country of origin, or
22that the graduate has to pay an annual compensatory exit tax - in this case
a Bhagwati tax - to his or her country of origin. The payment can be done
either by the graduate or by the government of the country where he or she
works; to guarantee that those two mechanisms are equivalent, we assume that
the graduate beneﬁts of a tax credit against his or her tax liabilities in the
destination country for the amounts paid to his or her country of origin.
Under that extended institutional design, the equilibrium numbers of credits














where superscript OD refers to the implication of both the origin and destina-
tions countries. Two interesting results then appear.
7.1 More credits at home and abroad
Comparison of equations (25) and (18) ﬁrst reveals that the number of credits
p e r m i t t e dt or e s i d e n ts t u d e n t s ,a n dt h u so fv o u c h e r sp r o v i d e dt ot h e m ,i sn o w
larger; this is typically due to the compensation of the externality. It turns out
that the measure lowers the threshold ρ
f provided by (19) and thus makes the
use of the Origin Principle more likely to be more eﬃcient than the current Pro-
duction Principle. Indeed the condition for the Origin Principle being superior
-o rf o rnO
ij being larger than nP
ij - becomes,
ρ>
b θ(wi + q + c − τij)
b θ
³













∝−ˆ θθcs < 0
so that the threshold goes down when working abroad compels the graduate to
compensate his or her country of origin for the ﬁnancing of his or her higher ed-
ucation. That mechanism makes the system discussed in this paper, more likely
to be more eﬃcient than the current one, based on the Production Principle.
Therefore,
Proposition 2 In the absence of tuition fee charged to the students, a system
of ﬁnancing higher education students based on the Origin Principle is more
likely to be more eﬃcient than a system of ﬁnancing schools of higher education
based on the Production Principle, when coupled with a mechanism compelling
the graduate working abroad, or his or her country of destination, to compensate
his or her country of origin in proportion of his or her working time spent abroad.
237.2 Equivalence with centralization
Finally we can compute the values of the compensation payment which ensure
the equality between nOD
k and nC
k , k = h,f.




ˆ θ(1 − ρh)
θ0 (w + c)
τij =
ˆ θ(1 − ρf)
˜ θ
(w + q + c) (27)
It turns out that if the graduate working abroad is hold to compensate his
or her country of origin, p r or a t at e m p o r i s ,for the social value of the loss of
domestic product w,t h ec o s tc and the possible extra cost q involved by his or
her studies, then applying the Origin Principle described so far, generates the
same quantity of studies abroad as that determined cooperatively or decided by
a benevolent central authority.
Then,
Proposition 3 In the absence of tuition fee charged to the students, a system of
ﬁnancing higher education students based on the Origin Principle, when coupled
with a mechanism compelling the graduate working abroad, or his or her country
of destination, to compensate his or her country of origin for the social value, in
proportion of his or her working time spent abroad, of the cost generated by his
or her studies, might be equivalent to the cooperative joint determination of the
quantity of studies or to that determination by a benevolent central authority.
8 Summary and conclusion
Though the Bologna process paves the way for a large international market
for graduates, nothing has been provided regarding the ﬁnancing of student
mobility. Therefore, countries with the best schools will become more attractive
for foreign students, but due to the mostly used mechanism for ﬁnancing higher
education, that quality will cost to the residents of the host country. In economic
terms, countries with best higher education will provide the other countries with
a positive externality and countries might be tempted to free ride their better
quality neighbors, with the risk that such a process eventually downsizes the
global quality of higher education.
Already, many students from France and possibly from The Netherlands are
educated in Belgian higher education institutions at the expense of the Bel-
gian taxpayer. In that sense France free rides Belgium; the same phenomenon
appears between Germany and Austria, especially in medicine, and again the
larger country free rides its smaller neighbor. That situation creates imbalances
and involves the appearance of protectionist behaviors from the local govern-
ments, like the introduction of quotas, which is exactly the opposite of what the
Bologna process aims.
24Therefore, in order to overcome those negative issues, we have suggested,
except for students from developing countries, to transfer the responsibility for
ﬁnancing higher education from the host country, to the country of origin of the
students.
The mechanism that we suggest and discuss consists for the origin country
to provide his and her students with a two-part portable voucher. The ﬁrst part
of the voucher intends to cover the true cost of studies and might be regarded
as a tuition fee voucher; it may be used in any higher education institution of a
deﬁned international area — say the EU or the Bologna area — provided it is used
in the ﬁeld of studies for which it is dedicated and in a school whose quality
has been recognized by the country of origin, possibly through a network of
certiﬁcation. The second part of the voucher is dedicated to ﬁnance the cost of
living at home or abroad, and can be called a student support voucher. That
part might be modulated to take into account dissimilarities in costs of living, or
to favour targeted groups of students or ﬁelds of studies, or still to compensate
extra costs related to the family situation of the student. In short one can say
that the second part of the voucher might be equity or fairness-oriented.
The combination of the two parts of the voucher makes it an interesting tool
to monitor the choice of the studies, and thus of the careers, as well as to favour
a more democratic access to higher education.
Vouchers can either be provided for free, or they can take the form of a
loan, or of a mix of a grant and a loan. This is up to the origin government to
take decision in that matter. However, as long as students going abroad come
back home after the completion of their studies and then spend their career
time in their country of origin, providing vouchers for free might be justiﬁed.
In contrast, when the mobility of graduates increases, so that the market for
graduates becomes Bologna-wide or EU-wide actually, completing the system of
vouchers by turning them from grants to loans in proportion of the time spent
working abroad or by introducing a system of Bhagwati tax to compensate
the country of origin is more eﬃcient. Its practicability will depend on the
integration of the Bologna or otherwise deﬁned area.
In the analytical part of the paper, we present a model and then use it to
investigate four cases successively. In that model we consider two countries
or jurisdictions and a federal or central jurisdiction named the centre. The
executives of the jurisdictions are governments; the executive of the centre is a
central agency like the European commission.11
The ﬁrst case is centralization: higher education is decided and ﬁnanced by
the centre; this is an interesting benchmark where spill over eﬀects have been
internalized, and which therefore makes sense for an integrated area where the
degree of mobility of students and graduates is high; however that setting is in
opposition with the subsidiarity principle at the root of the functioning of the
European Union.
In the second case, we ﬁt the model to the characteristics of the current
11Most results are developed assuming symmetrc jurisdictions; therefore an extension of the
exercise should be to investigate situations where countries are asymmeric.
25application of the Production Principle and show than the amounts of credits
obtained abroad, but also at home, are too low.
When we move to the application of the Origin Principle, the amount of
credits are higher and the outcome of the public ﬁnancing of higher education
becomes less ineﬃcient, provided that the probability to come back home after
completion of the studies and then to work in the country of origin, exceeds some
threshold - that situation is consistent with today relative mobility of labor in
the European Union and the Bologna area.
In the last case we show that such threshold goes down when the system
of vouchers provided by the country of origin is coupled with a mechanism
compelling the graduate working abroad, or his or her country of destination,
to compensate his or her country of origin. That mechanism can take the form
of turning the vouchers from grants to (contingent) loans p r or a t at e m p o r i sthe
fraction of the career spent abroad, or of paying a yearly Bhagwati tax. The
issue of the compensation being paid either by the graduate or by the country of
destination becomes irrelevant if the payment by the graduate may be credited
against his or her local tax liabilities in the country of destination.
That mechanism, although apparently complex, is actually feasible. National
practices by Switzerland, Norway and other Nordic countries, and Australia,
presented in appendix, preﬁgure some aspects of our proposal and highlight
the paper. Otherwise, interjurisdictional arrangements already exist, at least in
Europe, in social security matters, which provide that the country of origin of
a patient has to compensate the country where he or she has been hospitalized.
And, last but not least, a mechanism of compensation of the origin club - that
which provided the initial education of the player - by the series of destination
ones - those who beneﬁted from that education - applies for soccer players.
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29A Appendix: Some actual national practices
Three national practices are documented thereafter. The inter-cantonal clearing
system in Switzerland illustrates the feasibility of portable vouchers: a school in
canton y, rather than presenting the voucher directly to the issuing government
x, presents it to its own government which then introduces it in a clearing
process.
The Norwegian mechanism of portable vouchers is a good illustration of
the system we suggest, especially of its second part, but of the ﬁrst part too
as long as studies abroad are concerned - that system introduces references to
quality requirement and the additional costs like those related to the acquisition
of a foreign language. The examination of the Australian case completes our
discussion of grants vs. loans.
A.1 The Swiss system of inter-cantonal clearing
Switzerland is a confederation of 26 cantons with large executive and legislative
powers; various competencies are assigned to the cantons, shared between the
cantons and the confederation or reserved to that latter. Competencies on
higher education are among those divided between the confederation and the
cantons; moreover a process of standardization of the whole education system
is currently under way.
As in most federations a system of equalization, aiming at leveling inter-
cantonal diﬀerences, is at work in Switzerland. Interestingly, it also applies to
inter-cantonal mobility of students.
Since higher education is partly ﬁnanced by cantons, a system of clearing
has been set up which is called “Inter-cantonal University Agreement”. It aims
at creating a coordinated Swiss university policy; especially it guarantees access
to university in accordance with the principle of equality of treatment of Swiss
residents, and it ﬁxes the compensation that debtor cantons have to pay to
university cantons for students from their territory — see Conférence Suisse des
directeurs cantonaux de l’instruction publique (1997). A debtor canton is a
canton that has to pay a contribution to another canton: its outﬂow of students
exceeds its inﬂow. A university canton is a canton that supports the cost of a
university or of an equivalent institution located on its territory. The debtor
cantons pay an annual contribution to the university cantons for the education
of their resident students. The university cantons guarantee an equal access to
all Swiss students whichever their canton of residence. Thanks to a system of
clearing, debtor canton x must only pay a contribution to university canton y
in line with the diﬀerence between outgoing students to canton y and incoming
students from that canton. If the diﬀerence is negative canton x has nothing to
pay to canton y.
Notice that next to cantons funded universities, Switzerland has federal
schools of higher education like the federal polytechnic schools of Lausanne
and Zurich.
30A clearing system is also at work among Nordic countries — see Nordic Coun-
cil of Ministers (1996). It also aims at equalizing ﬁnancial contributions to higher
education, based on imbalances in terms of students’ mobility.
Both the Swiss and the Nordic devices should deserve further examination
and possibly be considered for application at the level of the EU or of the
Bologna area.
A.2 The Norwegian combination of loans and grants for
student’s life
Norway — see Levy (2004) and Lanekassen (2008) — has a long tradition of
designing ﬁnancing systems for his higher education which goes back to the
early post-World War II period.
Higher education in Norway is mostly public and free. Therefore there is
actually no need for ﬁnancial help for tuition fees. However ﬁnancial help might
be provided for the other costs related to studies. Since 1947 a single public
institution — the Norwegian State Educational Loan Fund or Lanekassen in
Norwegian — is in charge of the various instruments of the Norwegian State
regarding higher education.
The means of that fund are primarily directed to Norwegian citizens but
they are also available to foreigners, under some conditions.
The system of ﬁnancial help consists of grants, loans and loans conditionally
convertible into grants. A particular aspect of the system is that it is student
targeted, not family targeted. Students are considered as the beneﬁciaries of
the various helps. For Norwegian students staying home, a help of up to 10,000
EUR per academic year can be granted, initially as a loan; this loan, however,
can be partially or completely converted into a grant. In order to receive the
maximum grant, the Norwegian student has to live on his or her own, to pass all
the examinations, to earn less than 14,000 EUR and to have assets not exceeding
28,000 EUR. Additional loans can be provided given the family situation, e.g.
the fact that the student has dependent, like children.
For Norwegian students going abroad, the support is fully portable. Three
main conditions must be checked therefore: the equivalent quality of the foreign
host institution, the corresponding level of studies and the actual attendance to
the lectures. There are ﬁve main types of available ﬁnancial supports: a basic
support, a support for travel expenses, a language grants, a tuition support and
a supplementary tuition grant. Basic support is the same as for students staying
in Norway and it is intended to cover all living and study costs, except tuition
fees. The support given for travel expenses depends on the place of study. If a
new language must be learned the student may receive a grant for this purpose.
Since, unlike most other countries in the world, higher education is almost free
in Norway, a support is given for tuition fees in the host country. Finally, for
some highly prestigious institutions in some countries, like the US and UK, an
additional support is provided in order to compensate especially high tuition
fees.
31An original feature of the Norwegian system is that it provides the same
support to foreigners as to nationals, under very generous conditions. As soon
as he or she has been admitted in a Norwegian higher education institution and
has obtained a residence permit, a foreign student may apply for a support from
Norway. The foreign student is then treated as a Norwegian citizen. Foreign
students eligible for support are those coming from the Nordic countries, from
the member states of the European Economic Area, as well as those from Central
and Eastern Europe, Central Asia and developing countries. Also eligible are
political refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants, under some conditions. More
generally, the Fund deﬁnes the countries whose citizens may beneﬁtf r o mi t s
support.
Another important point is that Norway uses that ﬁnancing scheme for pur-
suing numerous policy goals, even if success is variable. The design of the
loan-grant mix, the relative weight given to each component and the conditions
for converting a loan into a grant reﬂect the aims that Norway pursues.
The main objectives are supporting students during the time spent in a
higher education institution, and enhancing equity through a larger access to
higher education, especially for poor students. These aims however are stan-
dard. Some other goals are more original. First is the philosophy of welfare
state common to Nordic countries. Let us mention two implications: the impor-
tance of caring for individual needs, hence the adaptation of help to the family
situation; and the one of distributing general income among citizens in order to
create social cohesion.
Concerning mobility, Norway aims to give an international character to its
higher education by promoting both studies abroad of its residents, and stays
in Norway of foreign students. Its very generous system makes it very easy for
Norwegian students to support the costs of studying abroad. Similarly Norway
tries to help developing countries by providing access to its system to foreign
students coming from those countries: for those latter students, loans are com-
pletely converted into grants if they decide to return home and to work in their
own country.
Another speciﬁc feature is the willingness of Norway to ensure a harmonious
economic development of its diﬀerent regions, even the most remote places. As
an example, a Norwegian student who decides to work in some remote area of
the country can have his loan completely converted into a grant.
To sum up, the Norwegian system has many interesting features and the de-
sign of the ﬁnancial support to student is shaped in line with its higher education
policy.
A.3 The Australian system of contingent loans
Australia has created a system of contingent loans to ﬁnance higher education
and mobility of students — see Australian Government, Department of Educa-
tion, Employment and Workplace Relations (2008). Higher education is ﬁnanced
by both the government and the students, through the so called Commonwealth
contribution and student contribution.
32As a general rule, all students who attend Australian higher education are
charged tuition fees. However several measures reduce the high of that contri-
bution: most students are Commonwealth supported. This means that they
are only required to pay a fraction of the tuition fees, called the student con-
tribution, while the commonwealth pays the rest. Students can then defer the
payment of their contribution through a HELP loan, called FEE-HELP. The
Higher Education Loan Program, or HELP, oﬀers free interest loans from the
government to Australian citizens and to some permanent residents under some
conditions. Other students are not Commonwealth supported; they must pay
the full fee and they receive no direct government contribution to the cost of
their education. HELP is jointly administered by the Department of Education,
Science and Training, DEST, and the Australian Tax Oﬃce, ATO. In addition
to these loans, some students are entitled to the Youth Allowance, to assist them
ﬁnancially during their studies. This help is means and assets tested.
FEE-HELP loans are interest free and must be repaid after graduation only if
the beneﬁciary earns revenues above a given threshold; they thus are contingent
loans. Another system is also available for mobile students, called OS-HELP.
This is an additional loan aiming at covering the costs related to higher ed-
ucation abroad. It is refundable according to the same rules as FEE-HELP.
However Australian citizens must be registered in an Australian institution and
must not spend all their studies abroad. Each OS-HELP loan covers costs for
six months and each beneﬁciary can only apply for two such loans over his or
her lifetime.
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